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Who cares if the digital economy is concentrated? Apparently, lots of people. 
“Many of the most innovative internet-derived digital markets, such as search engines, 
social networks, network operating systems, ecommerce, and ride-sharing, are highly 
concentrated and have been dominated by one or a few firms for a number of years. The 
lack of entry of competitors in these important markets—despite high profits—suggests 
either barriers to entry or exclusionary conduct, or both”1 declares Fiona Scott Morton2 
and her co-authors in a Stigler Center Report. Thomas Philippon argues “competition has 
declined in most sectors of the U.S. economy, ”3 paying particular attention to Amazon, 
Apple, Facebook, and Google as he makes his case, noting that “Information technology 
(IT) markets are highly concentrated.”4 Jason Furman and Peter Orszag fret that network 
effects “create tremendous barriers to entry in areas like online advertising, search, and 
operating systems for mobile phones and computers,”5 potentially leading to retarded 
 
* University of Pennsylvania Law School and Erasmus University Rotterdam. 
1 GEORGE J. STIGLER CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE ECON. & THE STATE, COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF DIG. 
PLATFORMS, MARKET STRUCTURE AND ANTITRUST SUBCOMM., REPORT 11 (2019) [hereinafter STIGLER CTR. 
REPORT], https://research.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/research/stigler/pdfs/market-structure-report.pdf. 
2 Elsewhere, Fiona Scott Morton notes that concentration measures are likely unhelpful in assessing 
competition and ultimate consumer welfare, instead preferring indicators such as price mark-ups (while 
noting that they too along with other accounting signals of reduced competition bear a complex 
relationship with consumer welfare and generally involve measurement difficulties). See Steven Berry, 
Martin Gaynor & Fiona Scott Morton, Do Increasing Markups Matter? Lessons from Empirical Industrial 
Organization, 33 J. ECON. PERSPS. 44 (2019). 
3 THOMAS PHILIPPON, THE GREAT REVERSAL: HOW AMERICA GAVE UP ON FREE MARKETS 9 (2019). 
4 Id. at 265. 
5 Jason Furman & Peter Orszag, Slower Productivity and Higher Inequality: Are They Related? 11-12 (Peterson 
Inst. for Int’l Econ., Working Paper No. 18-4, 2018), https://www.piie.com/system/files/documents/wp18-
4.pdf. 
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innovation6 and increasing inequality.7 
This academic concern is accompanied by substantial political hand wringing and 
calls for new approaches to regulating the big players in the digital economy. Toward the 
end of her campaign for the Democratic nomination for president, Elizabeth Warren 
wrote that as companies like Amazon, Google, and Facebook “have grown larger and 
more powerful, they have used their resources and control over the way we use the 
Internet to squash small businesses and innovation, and substitute their own financial 
interests for the broader interests of the American people. To restore the balance of power 
in our democracy, to promote competition, and to ensure that the next generation of 
technology innovation is as vibrant as the last, it’s time to break up our biggest tech 
companies.”8 Around the same time, in an Associated Press interview, Joe Biden also 
indicated an openness to intervention in the digital economy saying that breaking up 
large technology companies is “something we should take a really hard look at.”9 The 
 
6 The relationship between competition and innovation in general has long been and will continue to be 
debated. Innovation as an outcome is not particularly well-suited for rigorous empirical study given the 
uncertain time lags between investments in the inputs to innovation and the fruits of those investments. 
Relying on interesting lab experiments to side-step these empirical problems (at the potential cost of losing 
external validity), Philippe Aghion, Stefan Bechtold, Lea Cassar & Holger Herz, The Causal Effects of 
Competition on Innovation: Experimental Evidence, 34 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 162 (2018) shows that the links 
between competition and innovation are complicated even in the contrived experimental setting. Further 
highlighting the complicated nature of innovation, the Stigler Center report referenced above distinguishes 
between disruptive innovation and innovations made by incumbents, implying that the former type is 
better for consumers without much evidence. STIGLER CTR. REPORT, supra note 1, at 54.  
7 Furman and Orszag use increasing concentration as an indicator of reduced competition, as do many 
individuals in this literature. However, as argued by Autor, et al., The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of 
Superstar Firms, 135 Q.J. Econ., 645, 702-04 (2020), increased concentration can be a result of increasing 
competition that leads to a rise in inequality. Others dispute the supposed empirical regularity that 
concentration is rising, suggesting that more appropriate micro analyses of consumer markets do not 
support this assumption. See, e.g., Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, Pierre-Daniel Sarte & Nicholas Trachter, 
Diverging Trends in National and Local Concentration, at 4, in 35 NBER MACROECONOMICS ANNUAL 2020 
(Martin Eichenbaum & Erik Hurst eds., forthcoming 2020). 
8 Elizabeth Warren, Here’s How We Can Break up Big Tech, MEDIUM (Mar. 8, 2019), https://medium. 
com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big-tech-9ad9e0da324c.  
9 Hunter Woodall, 2020 Hopeful Biden Says He’s Open to Breaking up Facebook, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 13, 
2019), https://apnews.com/71c998ad3b39486ca1dcc220201b68b0. 
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growing scrutiny of Big Tech’s market power is bipartisan, as indicated by multiple 
inquiries by state attorneys general across the political spectrum,10 and even President 
Donald Trump has hinted his administration might join the fight against these 
companies. Trump indicated the federal government “should be suing Google and 
Facebook and all that,” adding, “perhaps we will.”11 
Those calling for action against the Big Tech companies generally agree that they 
are too big and that their size yields network externalities that insulate them from 
competition. In addition to being protected from competitors, both existing and future 
potential entrants, it is sometimes claimed that there are no real substitutes for the 
products offered by Big Tech firms, and it is sometimes suggested that the products are 
near necessities, allowing the firms to exploit consumers without limit. Some critics 
likewise argue that firms such as Google can use their advantage in their core market to 
gain market power in ancillary markets,12 further cementing their dominance and leading 
to an even broader erosion of consumer welfare. 
In addition to claims about the general exploitation of consumers and predictions 
that entry into digital markets is largely foreclosed by the dominance of companies like 
Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix, and Google (the so-called FAANG companies), as 
well as some other villains like Uber and Microsoft, other claimed ills arising from high 
 
10 See, e.g., Steve Lohr, New Google and Facebook Inquiries Show Big Tech Scrutiny Is Rare Bipartisan Act, N.Y 
TIMES (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/06/technology/attorney-generals-tech-antitrust-
investigation.html. 
11 Tony Romm, Trump Signals U.S. Government ‘Should Be Suing Google and Facebook’, WASH. POST (June 26, 
2019), https://nyti.ms/3gWU728.  
12 See, e.g., Benjamin Edelman, Does Google Leverage Market Power Through Tying and Bundling, 11 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON., 365 (2015). For an even more pointed direct attack, see Fiona M. Scott Morton & 
David C. Dinielli, Roadmap for a Monopolization Case Against Google Regarding the Search Market (Omidyar 
Network Working Paper 2020), https://www.omidyar.com/sites/default/files/Roadmap%20for%20a 
%20Monopolization%20Case%20Against%20Google%20Regarding%20the%20Search%20Market.pdf.  
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concentration in Big Tech include reduced innovation,13 increasing inequality,14 reduced 
privacy and security of personal data,15 and decimated markets for labor16 and other 
intermediate goods17, to say nothing of the demise of democracy itself.18 Big is bad, the 
story goes, when it comes to these tech giants, and the primary prescription is more 
antitrust intervention, including break-ups19 and direct regulation,20 as well as adopting 
new standards to govern antitrust law altogether.21 
These academic and policy concerns hinge critically on the claim that the relevant 
markets are highly concentrated.22 I investigate that claim and argue that many of the 
stylized concentration facts are misleading. I also provide some analysis suggesting that 
fears of leveraging supposed market dominance to gain control of related markets may 
 
13 See, e.g., Teresa Rivas, Breaking Up Amazon, Apple, and Facebook Could Drive More Innovation, Analyst Says, 
BARRON’S (June 19, 2019), https://www.barrons.com/articles/breaking-up-apple-facebook-amazon-google-
innovation-51560955244. 
14 See Shi-Ling Hsu, Antitrust and Inequality: The Problem of Super Firms, 63 ANTITRUST BULL. 104 (2018) for a 
review of some of these arguments. 
15 See, e.g., Dina Srinivasan, Why Privacy Is an Antitrust Issue, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2019), 
https://nyti.ms/35avyfG. 
16 See, e.g., Karen Weise & David McCabe, Unions Push F.T.C. to Study if Amazon Warps the Economy, N.Y. 
TIMES, February 27, 2020, https://nyti.ms/3haPvWl. 
17 See, e.g., Valentina Pop & Sam Schechner, Amazon to Face Antitrust Charges From EU Over Treatment of 
Third-Party Sellers, WALL ST. J. (June 11, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-to-face-antitrust-
charges-from-eu-over-treatment-of-third-party-sellers-11591871818?st=f2dla774u2blkl1.  
18 See, e.g., Lina Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 743 (2017). 
19 See, e.g., Lauren Hirsch & Megan Graham, States Are Leaning Toward a Push to Break up Google’s Ad Tech 
Business, CNBC (June 5, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/05/states-lean-toward-pushing-to-break-up-
googles-ad-tech-business.html. 
20 See, e.g., Cecilia Kang & Adam Satariano, Regulators Around the World Are Circling Facebook, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 25, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2ZcJfaf.  
21 See, e.g., Marshall Steinbaum & Maurice E. Stucke, The Effective Competition Standard: A New Standard for 
Antitrust, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 595 (2019). 
22 As noted earlier, increasing concentration could be consistent with increased competition and improved 
consumer welfare. Autor, et al., supra note 7. By saying these concerns hinge on increasing concentration, I 
am suggesting that increasing concentration is a necessary (although not sufficient) element of the concerns 
discussed here. 
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I. DEFINING MARKETS TOO NARROWLY IS QUESTION BEGGING 
Amazon is a behemoth when it comes to online sales. Based on common estimates, 
Amazon accounted for 37% of retail e-commerce sales in 2019, and it is expected to push 
40% by 2021.23 The next closest competitors (Wal-Mart and eBay) do not even control 5% 
of e-commerce sales each.24 However, relegating Amazon’s market to e-commerce rather 
than retail more generally might be a little like treating Sonic as controlling the market 
for hamburgers delivered to your car while you sit in a parking lot stall because 
McDonald’s won’t do that. That is, there is little a priori reason to carve out something 
known as e-commerce from retail more generally. In fact, data from a 2018 survey suggest 
that most consumers still prefer shopping offline. When asked, “If you had to choose, 
which would you say is your preferred method of shopping? . . . In person at a store, 
online, with items being shipped to you, online, and picking up items at a store,” 55% 
indicated they preferred to shop in person at a store, and an additional 5% said they 
preferred to shop online but pick the item up at a store. Of the remaining respondents, 
37% said they preferred shopping wholly online.25 Given this background preference for 
in-person shopping, treating e-commerce as its own market, as opposed to a substitute to 
the primary retailing market, may be problematic. The survey data strongly indicate that 
most shoppers regularly bounce between physical and online retailers. 
If U.S. retail sales more generally are taken as the denominator of Amazon’s 
 
23 See eMarketer, Amazon Remains the Undisputed No. 1 (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.emarketer. 
com/content/amazon-remains-the-undisputed-no-1. 
24 ANDREW LIPSMAN, TOP 10 US ECOMMERCE COMPANIES 2020 WALMART AND TARGET CLIMB RANKINGS ON 
CLICK-AND-COLLECT GAINS (2020), https://www.emarketer.com/content/top-10-us-ecommerce-companies-
2020. 
25 CNBC. CNBC All-America Economic Survey, Dec, 2018 [survey question]. 31117461.00038. Hart Research 
Associates/Public Opinion Strategies [producer]. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public 
Opinion Research, iPOLL [distributor], accessed Jul-24-2020. 
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market share, the company looks a lot less threatening. As seen in Table 1, switching the 
relevant market to overall retail sales as opposed to e-commerce sales will reduce 
Amazon’s measured market share significantly. 
Table 1: E-Commerce as a Share of Total Retail Sales 
 






2010 3,816,760 169,141 4% 
2011 4,102,027 199,098 5% 
2012 4,296,762 230,771 5% 
2013 4,458,197 262,303 6% 
2014 4,633,589 301,365 7% 
2015 4,721,579 344,982 7% 
2016 4,837,599 395,987 8% 
2017 5,058,370 457,239 9% 
2018 5,272,247 518,468 10% 
2019 5,452,351 595,916 11% 
Note: Data source is U.S. Census Bureau, Retail Indicators Branch. Annual figures are 
summed from quarterly adjusted figures from Quarterly E-Commerce Report available 
at https://www.census.gov/retail/mrts/www/data/excel/tsadjustedsales.xls.  
  
In its financial statements,26 Amazon does not provide U.S. specific sales numbers. 
It does break out the North American component of net sales, with North America 
representing 61% in both 2018 and 2019. Amazon does not provide this geographic 
breakdown when differentiating net product sales from net service sales (which includes 
things like Amazon Web Services), but assuming that the breakdown for North America 
is comparable to that for the company as a whole (i.e., about 60% of total net sales come 
from net product sales), Amazon’s North American net product sales were about $103 
billion in 2019. Since the U.S. net product sales would only be a subset of this North 
American number, the absolute maximum share of U.S. retail sales accounted for by 
 
26 Amazon.com, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc= 
/Archives/edgar/data/1018724/000101872420000004/amzn-20191231x10k.htm. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3733695





Amazon’s first party sales is less than 2%. 
Third party sales on Amazon’s platform are often included in the conventional 
estimates of Amazon’s share of e-commerce. It is not clear that these sales should be 
lumped together for market concentration purposes. If, however, one includes third party 
sales, the total “Amazon-related” share of total U.S. retail sales is likely well below 5%.27 
As a point of comparison, Walmart’s U.S. net sales of $331,666 million in 2019 represent 
about a 6% share of total U.S. retail sales,28 despite lagging behind Amazon in terms of e-
commerce share, where Walmart holds about 5%.29 Interestingly, Amazon’s success in 
attracting third party sellers to its platform appears to have induced Walmart to enter 
that market as well.30 
Perhaps the narrow framing of e-commerce as its own market is the correct one. If 
consumers buying their retail goods online from Amazon and Walmart are distinct from 
the consumers who drive to Amazon or Walmart stores (among others) to buy something 
they want, with little competition across the shopping channels (as well as others such as 
catalogues or other direct marketing approaches), e-commerce should be treated as a 
distinct market. However, if changes in one channel (such as price movements, changes 
in quality provided, service levels, etc.) affect consumer choices in the other channel, it is 
not valid to act as if Amazon exists independently of brick and mortar retailers. 
Unfortunately, the academic literature does not provide much in the way of well-
identified, rigorous econometric analyses of the degree to which these market channels 
 
27 Amazon’s financial statements do not include figures for the net sales by third parties on Amazon. In a 
letter to Amazon shareholders, Jeff Bezos suggested that third party sales accounted for a little less than 
60% of total net sales in 2018. Jeff Bezos, 2018 Letter Shareholders (2020), https://www.sec.gov 
/Archives/edgar/data/1018724/000119312519103013/d727605dex991.htm. 
28 See Walmart Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Jan. 31, 2020). 
29 See LIPSMAN, supra note 24. 
30 See Melissa Repko, Walmart Steps up Competition with Amazon by Fulfilling Orders for Third-Party Vendors, 
CNBC (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/25/walmart-wants-to-make-it-easier-for-third-party-
vendors.html. 
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interact, leaving it as a mostly open question of how much competition Amazon actually 
faces.  
One interesting study, however, might provide some clues about how much 
competitive discipline Amazon faces. A 2018 paper by Brian Baugh, Itzhak Ben-David, 
and Hoonsuk Park examined how consumers changed their electronics purchasing 
behavior when states required Amazon to collect sales taxes on Amazon purchases.31 
First, the authors found that consumers were sensitive to the change, reducing their 
Amazon purchases, especially for higher priced electronic items. Second, they found 
substantial substitution toward the second largest online electronics retailer (Newegg) 
which was not required to collect sales taxes by and large due to its limited legal contacts 
with jurisdictions outside of California. Perhaps most interestingly, the authors found 
that “heavy” Amazon users were the most sensitive to this cost change, suggesting that 
Amazon potentially faces competition even for its highest volume users. This implies that 
even though Amazon would appear to have a tight hold of the supposed e-commerce-
specific market, effective price changes of a few percent lead consumers to switch to other 
online options. Unfortunately, because the paper only examines electronics products, we 
are left wondering to what degree there is substitution in other product categories. That 
said, survey evidence suggests that price is a primary driver of Amazon shoppers. In 
December 2015, 56% of Amazon users indicated that price is “extremely important” with 
another 24% saying price was “pretty important” to them.32 
This paper does not provide much insight into the extent of competitive rivalry 
between Amazon and physical retailers. The authors only examine potential substitution 
 
31 Brian Baugh, Itzhak Ben-David & Hoonsuk Park, Can Taxes Shape an Industry? Evidence from the 
Implementation of the ‘Amazon Tax’, 73 J. FIN. 1819 (2018). 
32 HART RESEARCH ASSOCIATES/PUBLIC OPINION STRATEGIES, CNBC AAES FOURTH QUARTER SURVEY 12 
(Nov./Dec. 2015), https://www.scribd.com/doc/292784115/CNBC-All-America-Economic-Survey-results-
December-9-2015. 
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to a single brick and mortar retailer (Best Buy) and do not find a statistically significant 
effect. A related paper, while not examining Amazon, does look at the effect of a similar 
natural experiment involving the reduction of sales tax on some apparel items in New 
York City and the coincident effect on the online and catalog sales of a specific retailer’s 
sales to customers in New York City as compared to simultaneous changes to customers 
in unaffected locales (Connecticut and Massachusetts). That paper found a significant 
reduction in the retailer’s online and catalogue sales that appears to be causal as New 
York City shoppers substituted to making purchases at physical stores in the city. Again, 
although this does not directly tell us about whether Amazon competes with brick and 
mortar stores, it does hint at the competitive dynamic between physical and online 
retailers.33 
Perhaps a similar natural experiment could be examined based on when Amazon 
introduced same-day delivery in a handful of markets in 2015.34 Presumably, prior to the 
availability of same-day delivery, if online and brick and mortar outlets are competitors, 
one of the reasons a consumer might choose to buy at a physical store is due to 
impatience. With the introduction of shorter shipping times, the benefit of buying at an 
actual store is reduced. If non-online retail sales dropped (in relative terms) in markets 
where Amazon introduced same-day delivery, this would be reasonably strong evidence 
that online retail outlets and physical retail outlets should be included in the same 
market. If no such effect is observed, that would be prima facia evidence that the two 
markets are indeed distinct.35 Without such evidence, discussing policies to head off 
 
33 Yu Jeffrey Hu & Zhulei Tang, The Impact of Sales Tax on Internet and Catalog Sales: Evidence from a 
Natural Experiment, 32 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 84 (2014). 
34 If data were available, there is potentially even more variation to exploit in this experiment to the extent 
that same-day delivery was not available for every product. 
35 Of course, the intuition presented here makes the ceteris paribus assumption regarding the relative price 
(net of shipping) and quality of the Amazon and other retailers’ goods before and after the policy change. 
In practice, the researcher would need to account for possible changes. 
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Amazon’s supposed monopoly power would seem to be premature at best. 
The early 2020 coronavirus experience may present a similar, though potentially 
more complicated, natural experiment from which we can learn about the contours of 
what in which Amazon resides. As cities and states adopted stay at home regulations and 
ordered the closure of physical retail establishments, online retail went largely 
unaffected. If physical retail sales do not present competitive discipline for Amazon and 
its online competitors, presumably we should not observe much of a substitution 
between physical retail sales and online sales. Instead, the physical sales should have 
largely disappeared altogether. Such a study design would need to account for non-
competitive influences impacting online sales, such as expected reductions in income 
generated by the coronavirus pandemic, as well as exogenous demand shifters (e.g., as 
individuals bought equipment to transition to work in at-home offices), but these are the 
kinds of studies that are needed to determine whether e-commerce is its own market; 
market definition should not be based on intuitive say-so. 
On top of these existing (though as yet unknown or at least not rigorously 
quantified) market dynamics, the extent to which Amazon can exploit consumers and 
even third party retailers is also potentially limited by entry and expansion in the U.S. 
market by firms like Alibaba.36 If consumers are really harmed by Amazon somehow 
favoring its own products over those of third party sellers, a concern raised by a number 
of critics that has also generated congressional scrutiny,37 Alibaba’s model of just 
providing a sales platform without first party product competition would presumably 
attract U.S. consumers and third party retailers. Alibaba surely has the technical and 
 
36 See, e.g., Warren Shoulberg, It’s Alibaba, Not Walmart, That Amazon Should Really Be Worried About, FORBES 
(June 15, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/warrenshoulberg/2020/06/15/its-alibaba-not-walmart-that-
amazon-should-be-really-worried-about/#65484ee07ddc. 
37 See, e.g., Gilad Edelman, Amazon Doesn’t Favor Its Own Brands—Except When It Does, WIRED (Nov. 24, 
2019), https://www.wired.com/story/amazon-gating-private-labels-antitrust/. 
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financial wherewithal to compete with Amazon if there is a demand for it. 
II. MIND YOUR PS AND YOUR QS 
In the book The Great Reversal: How America Gave Up on Free Markets, Thomas 
Philippon names a chapter “Bad Concentration, Good Concentration” where he suggests 
that as Walmart gained market share in the 1980s and 1990s, consumers benefited with 
lower prices. He attributes this decline in retail prices to, among other things, Walmart’s 
advances in logistics and supply chain management. “The growth of Walmart provides 
us with an example of efficient concentration. Its profit margins remain stable or even 
decline, and most important, prices go down. Consumers benefit from Walmart’s 
expansion. It is fair to debate and challenge Walmart’s labor and management practices, 
but there is little doubt that Walmart has been good for U.S. consumers.”38 Philippon uses 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s PCE (Personal Consumption Expenditures) index, 
which is a price deflator for goods and services purchased by consumers in a given year, 
relative to the overall consumer price index (CPI) showing that this metric of retail prices 
was well above the broader CPI from 1960 through the mid-1980s, at which point it 
declined steadily until about 2005, at which point the ratio flattened.39 Philippon argues 
that the period of declining retail prices coincides with Walmart’s increase in retail 
market share,40 whereas the flattening portion of the curve matches Amazon’s 
ascendency: “We have seen that, as Walmart’s market share increased, retail prices 
decreased sharply. But the improvement stops in 2005. This coincides with the 
development of online shopping, and in particular with the growth of Amazon.41” 
Philippon purports to focus on a data driven approach that favors many empirical 
 
38 PHILIPPON, supra note 3, at 34. 
39 Id. at 33. 
40 Id. at 32. 
41 Id. at 39. 
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metrics when examining his argument that firms like Amazon have made markets in the 
U.S. less competitive and, therefore, have made consumers worse off. As suggested 
above, Philippon examines prices, as well as profit margins and productivity measures. 
However, in his Walmart and Amazon (good concentration and bad concentration) 
example, he ignores one of the best metrics of consumer well-being – consumption. 
People don’t eat prices; they can’t even hang them on the wall and marvel at them. We 
care about prices because they affect how much an individual consumes. Further, the 
prices Philippon examines are only one component of the total price, which includes the 
cost of acquiring the object (time and effort to go to the store, or the cost of shipping, or 
the effect of delay, etc.). Ignoring the latter components of total price, while 
understandable given the lack of systematic data on these aspects, might be misleading. 
Perhaps it makes more sense to look at how much people are consuming in the various 
periods of Walmart’s rise and Amazon’s rise. 
In Figure 1 below, I use the same PCE index42 used by Philippon to deflate the 
retail sales data provided by Census43 on a per capita basis using Census population data. 
While Philippon uses 2005 as his “online shopping” break point, the Great Recession 
(2007-2009) is an obvious confounder. Instead, I break the time series into 1992 (the 
beginning point for the currently posted retail data from Census) through 2006 and 2010 
through 2019. 
 
42 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Personal Consumption Expenditures, https://fred.stlouisfed. 
org/series/PCE. 
43 U.S. Census Bureau, Estimates of Monthly Retail and Food Services Sales by Kind of Business: 2020, 
https://www.census.gov/retail/mrts/www/mrtssales92-present.xls.  
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As indicated by the graph, retail consumption is trending at basically a comparable 
rate44 in Philippon’s Amazon/online shopping period as it was through the 1990s during 
the period when Walmart generated increasing concentration in the retail market 
generally. Based on this metric of consumer well-being, it is hard to declare that 
Walmart’s concentration was somehow good for consumers, while Amazon’s 
concentration is somehow bad. 
Philippon does suggest that Walmart’s gains went primarily to poor people while 
Amazon’s accrue to those from a higher socio-economic class, saying “Walmart created 
more value for lower-income consumers. Amazon is more valuable for upper middle-
class households whose disposable income and opportunity cost of time are relatively 
high.”45 Such a claim is based on intuition rather than any data. One can easily think of 
possible counter claims. For example, for poor individuals lacking reliable and 
 
44 Given the limited number of observations, it is not sensible to formally test equality of these trends in a 
statistical sense. 
45 PHILIPPON, supra note 3, at 40. 
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convenient transportation, venturing out to do one’s shopping becomes more of a chore 
than it is for a suburban family loading into its SUV for a Sam’s Club run. Similarly, 
individuals working an inflexible schedule might find it difficult to get to a store during 
business hours,46 whereas a busy white-collar professional might have more control over 
the particulars of her schedule. On the other hand, the poor may face other impediments 
to online shopping such as less access to credit cards and less of an ability to secure 
delivered packages. It is interesting to note, however, given Philippon’s assumption 
regarding Walmart being more valuable for the poor and Amazon being more valuable 
for richer people, Amazon has made attempts to increase its services for lower income 
people.47  
Rather than speculate, it is useful to explore the data. The Bureau of Labor 
Statistics has a long-running consumer expenditure survey, which asks people how much 
they spend on various categories of goods and services. In Figures 2-6, I use the average 
total reported consumption amount, deflated by Philippon’s PCE index plotted for the 
same time periods used above for total per capita retail sales, namely 1992-2006 and 2010 
through 2018 (the last available year for the Consumer Expenditure Survey) separately 
for individuals in each income quintile. 
 
46 While many Walmarts are open 24 hours per day, seven days per week, not all are. See, e.g., Kelly Tyko, 
Walmart Cuts Hours at 24-Hour Stores and Other Locations Nationwide Starting Sunday Due to Coronavirus, USA 
TODAY (Mar. 14, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2020/03/14/coronavirus-walmart-store-
hours-retailer-temporary-change/5052603002/.  
47 See, e.g., Derek Thompson, Amazon's Pivot to Poor People: Amazon Wants To Become Walmart Faster than 
Walmart Can Become Amazon, THE ATLANTIC (June 6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
business/archive/2017/06/amazons-pivot-to-poor-people/529383/.  
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If one were to buy into Philippon’s notion that the 1990s through 2005 or so were 
the period when Walmart was helping poor people and the 2005 plus period is when 
Amazon was helping well-off people, the consumption data don’t provide much support. 
For all income quintiles, both periods, excluding the 2007-2009 Great Recession, represent 
increasing trends in real consumption. If anything, the first and second quintile folks (i.e., 
the relatively poor) have seen a steeper growth in Philippon’s Amazon/online shopping 
period. 
The aggregate consumption numbers may be a bit over-broad for the purposes of 
focusing on the types of goods Walmart and Amazon sell; to mitigate this concern, in 
Figures 7-10, I examine the consumption data for only the first income quintile 
respondents by various categories of consumption to better isolate any possible 
Walmart/Amazon effects. In each case, I again deflate by the PCE index.48 
 
48 While using sector-specific price indexes would provide even better indications of consumption quantity, 
I continue to use the PCE index for continuity’s sake. Using sector-specific deflators yields comparable 
trends.  
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In figure 7, food expenditures are used. In the Amazon period, real food 
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For clothing, shown in Figure 8, real consumption among those in the first quintile 
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Figure 9 examines real consumption of personal care products among those in the 
first quintile of income. The upward trend in the Amazon period exceeds that observed 
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Figure 10 plots deflated expenditures on reading products. In this case, while the 
reading consumption metric declined steadily in the Walmart period, it rises during 
Amazon’s ascendency. 
 
By these consumption metrics, with the exception of clothing purchases, it would 
appear as if the Amazon period has actually been relatively good for those at the bottom 
of the socio-economic ladder. Consumption, which is central to any notion of consumer 
welfare, has improved as Amazon has increased its market share. Now I do not make any 
claim to causality. That is, it is not possible short of better data (used in a design like that 
suggested above where one examines various shocks to the availability of various 
Amazon and/or Walmart products and services) to assess whether Amazon or Walmart, 
through any channel including increasing concentration, has led to, in a causal sense, any 
of the trends depicted in the figures above.  
Likewise, even if we were confident that such a causal relationship existed, it is 
impossible to know how the mechanism works—is it because of a reduction in prices 
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faced by the poor, is it because the total cost (explicit price plus time and convenience 
costs) declined, is it because the availability of products was better suited to the tastes of 
people in this income category, is it because Amazon increases the income of the poor 
through better jobs or by providing an easier way to sell products (through the Amazon 
market place), is it some mix of each of these, or something else altogether? The only point 
made with these data points is that Philippon’s assumption that Amazon only or even 
primarily benefits the well-off is not obviously true, and there is at least some evidence 
to suggest it is false. 
Philippon continues to focus on price differences when comparing the supposedly 
worse regulatory environment of the United States to various European exemplars.49 In 
the introductory chapter of his book, Philippon uses broadband internet, mobile phones, 
and plane tickets as illustrative examples of how the United States has done worse than 
Europe, implying that this is because competition has declined in the United States and 
this “lack of competition is explained largely by policy choices,”50 including weaker 
antitrust enforcement. Although he notes that all proxies for competition are imperfect, 
and notes particular problems in examining price having to do with taxes and exchange 
rate comparisons, Philippon sticks to price, profit rates, and market shares as his metrics 
for indicating the welfare of consumers. 
In each of these cases, however, it is easy to imagine aspects of welfare that are 
poorly proxied by price. A cheaper 25 Mbps broadband connection might be inferior to a 
gigabit connection, at least for some consumers, and unreliable service at either speed 
might be shunned for a slower but steadier connection. Mobile phones come bundled 
with all sorts of services (subsidized streaming subscriptions, hardware rebates, 
beneficial contract terms, etc.) that may be favored by some consumers even if they lead 
 
49 See PHILIPPON, supra note 3, at 5-10. 
50 Id. at 9. 
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to higher mobile phone subscription costs. Ryan Air or French Bee might offer lower base 
ticket prices, but individuals may prefer higher cost options that allow for marginally 
more pleasant flights. 
Once again, price comparisons might not be the best approach when trying to 
proxy for subjective consumer welfare when products are multi-dimensional and 
heterogeneous. Although not perfect, examining outcome metrics may shed more light 
when comparing the attractiveness of regulatory regimes. 
With regard to broadband, Philippon notes the higher average monthly cost of 
broadband in the United States compared to Germany or France in 2017. More recent 
data (2019) from the same source tells the same story with the average cost (in U.S. dollar 
terms) of the surveyed broadband packages coming in at $28.74 for Germany, $27.81 for 
France, with a whopping $50 for the United States.51 What Philippon does not note, 
however, is that the story is reversed when the cost per megabit per month is examined 
with Germany costing $0.50, France at $0.49, and the United States coming in at about 
half the cost with a per megabit per month cost of $0.26. While these numbers do not tell 
us conclusively where consumers are “better off,” they do put a wrinkle in Philippon’s 
story. It might also be interesting to note that, perhaps predictably, U.S. consumers are 
much more likely to have higher speed broadband plans than either of those European 
countries. According to OECD data for 2019, while only 11% and 12% of residents in 
Germany and France respectively have broadband plans with speeds between 100 and 
1,000 Mbps, 21% of U.S. residents do.52 Data on average speed of connection by country 
in 2017 tell a similar story with the United States notching 19 Mbps, followed by Germany 
 
51 Cable.co.uk, The Cost of Fixed-Line Broadband in 206 Countries, https://www.cable.co.uk 
/broadband/pricing/worldwide-comparison/.  
52 OECD, Fixed Broadband Subscriptions Per 100 Inhabitants, Per Speed Tiers (Dec. 2019), https://www.oecd.org 
/sti/broadband/5.1-FixedBB-SpeedTiers-2019-12.xls.  
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at 15 Mbps, with France bringing up the rear at 11 Mbps.53 These numbers, however, are 
only inputs to the ultimate consumption question (which itself is an input, albeit an 
important one, to the consumer welfare question). One estimate of broadband 
consumption suggests that the broadband consumption of the average internet user in 
the United States approaches 2 terabytes annually, whereas Germany and France barely 
get above 0.5 terabytes per user.54 
In his analysis of the mobile phone comparison between the United States and 
France (in a chapter titled “How European Markets Became Free” presumably in contrast 
to the book’s subtitle “How America Gave Up on Free Markets”), Philippon presents a 
striking picture where the price of a telecom subscription in France was 10-20% higher 
than in the United States until 2011, when, as Philippon tells it, Free Mobile obtained a 
4G license and “became a significant competitor for the incumbents, making an 
immediate impact. Until 2011, French consumers paid between €45 and €65 per month 
for their smart-phone plans, with limited data and a few hours of talk time. Free offered 
unlimited talk, unlimited SMS and MMS messages, and unlimited data with a speed 
reduction after 3GB for €20.55” By 2014, Philippon notes that France went from having 
telecom prices that were 15% higher than the United States to 25% cheaper. In terms of 
explaining the institutional mechanisms behind this reversal, Philippon argues that 
European regulators are tougher, more independent, and less prone to lobbying than 
their counterparts in the United States.56 
 
53 AKAMAI, STATE OF THE INTERNET Q1 2017 REPORT (2017), https://www.akamai. 
com/fr/fr/multimedia/documents/state-of-the-internet/q1-2017-state-of-the-internet-connectivity-
report.pdf.  
54 Bhaskar Chakravorti, Ajay Bhalla & Ravi Shankar Chaturvedi, Which Countries Are Leading the Data 
Economy? HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 24, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/01/which-countries-are-leading-the-data-
economy.  
55 PHILIPPON, supra note 3, 140-141. 
56 Id. at 142-143. 
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As suggested before, however, prices tell only a limited, and potentially 
misleading story. With my current mobile phone plan, which admittedly costs lots, I have 
bundled access to at least one streaming service that my kids use, a host of internet tools 
that allow me to shut off that streaming service and their phones when the kids annoy 
me, and it includes multiple discounts on replacement phones that I buy for the same 
annoying kids. How should all of that be factored into adjusting the price of my 
subscription to compare it with Free Mobile’s plan which, as best as my limited French 
(which consists of being able to say “hon hon hon” and “Gerard Depardieu”) can tell me, 
includes no bundled streaming service but does include a better allowance for 
international calls and might include some kind of phone hardware discount?  
A potential way forward, once again, is to look at quantity or usage metrics. A 
phone plan that provides more value will be used by more people and will be used more 
intensively on average. That is, higher quantity is a useful proxy for higher consumer 
welfare. OECD data on mobile broadband subscriptions in 2019 indicates that people in 
the United States have 149 mobile broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, whereas 
France has 94 and Germany has 87. Only Finland (155) and Estonia (158) have a higher 
rate than the United States in Europe, and the only other country in the dataset that 
exceeds the United States is Japan at 179.57 At least on the extensive margin, the usage in 
the United States appears inconsistent with the story painted by Philippon. As for the 
intensive margin, in a month, a U.S. subscriber uses about 3.1 GB of mobile data. This 
exceeds the 1.8 GB number for Germany, but it lags the 3.5 volume for France.58 However, 
recalling that there are almost 1.5 mobile broadband subscriptions for each inhabitant in 
the U.S. as compared to 0.94 for France suggests that, on a per person basis, the United 
 
57 OECD, Historical Fixed Broadband Subscriptions Per 100 Inhabitants, https://www.oecd.org/sti/ 
broadband/1.5-BBPenetrationHistorical-Data-2019-12.xls.  
58 OECD, MEASURING THE DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION: A ROADMAP FOR THE FUTURE 101 (2019). 
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States leads France 4.6 GB to 3.3 GB.59 In either case, the usage metrics point in a different 
direction than Philippon’s price comparison. 
As for Philippon’s last example, airlines, while not part of the digital economy, a 
similar critique of Philippon’s analysis can be made. Philippon notes a large increase in 
the concentration of the U.S. airline industry between 2010 and 202060 and also includes 
a direct comparison of prices and profitability of the U.S. industry with the European 
market. He writes, “airlines are probably among the worst offenders. The Economist 
noted in 2017, ‘Airlines in North America posted a profit of $22.40 per passenger last year; 
in Europe the figure was $7.84 [footnote omitted].’ Around 2010, the net profit per 
passenger was similar in both regions, but since then, prices have increased more in the 
United States than in Europe.61” 
Illuminating price metrics are perhaps most elusive in the airline industry. Are 
bags bundled in the price? How about beer and pretzels? How many miles do I get for 
the flight and what can I trade them in for? What are the flight change rules? Can I watch 
the newest superhero movie or am I stuck with a half filled in Sudoku grid to pass the 
time? The variables that require adjustments in coming up with a sensible price 
comparison are many and life is short. Luckily, as in the previous analyses, we can look 
to quantity metrics as a kind of catch all proxy. Despite being so expensive according to 
Philippon, the U.S. domestic market is the largest single market in terms of air travel 
passengers as of 2018, with almost 600 million passengers.62 In terms of total passengers 
flown, both domestically and internationally, the United States again leads the world 
 
59 Multiplying the average data used per month per subscriber by the average number of subscriptions per 
resident yields a per resident data usage figure. 
60 PHILIPPON, supra note 3, at 37. 
61 Id. at 7. 
62 INT’L AIR TRANSP. ASSOC., WORLD AIR TRANSPORT STATISTICS 5 (2019) [hereinafter IATA], https://www 
.iata.org/contentassets/a686ff624550453e8bf0c9b3f7f0ab26/wats-2019-mediakit.pdf. 
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with almost 800 million,63 as compared to France with 140 million and Germany with 171 
million.64 These counts are not perfect quantity metrics to the extent that there 
presumably needs to be some control for population, though the punchline does not 
change on a per capita basis with the United States coming in at 2.4 passengers per 
person, with France and Germany’s measure at around 2.1. Beyond the population 
normalization issue, these passenger counts, and miles flown data lump together flights 
by foreign airlines in the United States and U.S. airlines in other countries. That said, in 
terms of both measures, four of the top five airlines are U.S. firms.65 While there is no 
ideal quantity measure for this market, it is perhaps surprising that so much flying is 
done with airlines that Philippon suggests are so expensive in relative terms. 
As a general matter, quantity indicators are at least as important as price metrics 
when making inferences about consumer welfare, and for a number of reasons, quantity 
might be superior to price when it comes to judging the competitiveness of a market. 
Adjustments for quality, convenience, selection, and a host of other factors are necessary 
when judging consumer welfare effects based on price, but these adjustments are always 
difficult and are often not possible, especially when subjective valuation is taken 
seriously. Quantity metrics, on the other hand, effectively have these adjustments already 
baked in. Of course, when making causal inferences about the effect of some public policy 
decision or firm choice on quantity, it is necessary to control for other shifters of supply 
and demand in a rigorous way, but the same is true when examining price. At a 
minimum, price should not be used to the exclusion of quantity when making claims 
about what is good for consumers. 
 
63 The U.S.’s measure of total distance flown is likewise tops in the world. See IATA, supra note 62, at 18. 
64 Id. at 31-33. 
65 Id. at 19-20. 
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III. GREAT GOOGLEY MOOGLY 
Many of the earlier issues can be raised with respect to the concentration claims 
about Google, especially in terms of what is the relevant market. After briefly examining 
that issue, I consider the claim that Google can leverage its power in the search market to 
gain uncompetitive advantages in related markets. 
It is generally assumed that Google has a massive advantage in the internet search 
market. By most counts, Google accounts for something like 90% of internet searches if 
not more.66 Google’s number in the United States might be as high as 95%. The next three 
most popular search engines, Bing, Yahoo!, and Baidu might make up a total of 5% of the 
worldwide market. As imposing as those numbers are, as shown in Figure 11, Google’s 
share is actually on an upward trend over the last decade, though, presumably, such a 
trend cannot go on forever.  
 
 
66 See, e.g., StatCounter, Search Engine Market Share Worldwide, https://gs.statcounter.com/search-engine-
market-share which indicated google accounted for almost 92% of worldwide internet searches in June 
2020. 
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All of that said, it is worth considering whether other forms of information search 
online should actually be included in the discussion of Google’s dominance. For example, 
in a 2018 poll, when asked where they start shopping online, two-thirds of respondents 
said something other than “a search engine such as Google,” with 44% indicating they 
started with Amazon, 10% saying they start with a specific retailer’s website, 6% 
indicating a product brand’s website, and 5% starting with a non-Amazon online market 
place like eBay.67 When shoppers have a specific product in mind, they appear to be even 
less likely to start their search on Google.68  
Searching for information outside of the search engine framework appears to 
extend beyond shopping as well. When asked about where they get information about 
political candidates, less than half of respondents in a 2018 poll said they used a search 
engine such as Google, mentioning social media sites more often, and including a sizable 
dose of other online sources such as newspaper, television and radio station, and 
magazine websites, as well as blogs.69 A 2018 poll likewise found Google search lagging 
behind other online sources when people were looking for information about breaking 
news, with only 15% of respondents mentioning a search engine.70 Further, the standard 
search engine market share numbers ignore peoples use of other websites and 
applications to search for information (e.g., Yelp, Wikipedia, etc.). All in all though, even 
with these adjustments, Google would likely continue to have a formidable lead in the 
 
67 NPR/MARIST, POLL RESULTS JUNE 2018: DIGITAL ECONOMY 13 (2018), http://maristpoll.marist.edu/wp-
content/misc/usapolls/us180423_NPR/NPR_Marist%20Poll_Tables%20of%20Questions_ 
May%202018.pdf#page=2.  
68 See, e.g., Greg Magana, Amazon Rules the Product Search Process, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 20, 2019), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/online-shoppers-rely-heavily-on-amazon-2019-3. 
69 Associated Press/MTV. MTV/AP-NORC Youth Political Pulse Survey, Sep, 2018 [survey question]. 
31115630.00018. AP-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research [producer]. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: 
Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, iPOLL [distributor], accessed Jul-25-2020. 
70 Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. Pew Research Center for the People & the Press Poll, 
Feb, 2018 [survey question]. 31115098.00065. GfK Knowledge Networks [producer]. Cornell University, 
Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, iPOLL [distributor], accessed Jul-25-2020. 
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way people search electronic sources for information. 
Among the more important concerns raised about Google’s dominant position in 
search is whether it can leverage that position to gain advantages in other markets. 
Clearly, this concern was raised in the European Commission’s Google Shopping case 
which resulted in a €2.4 billion fine71 and is also central in the EC’s Google AdSense case 
which resulted in a €1.49 billion fine.72 Rather than re-litigate those cases, which would 
involve much more than a book chapter allows, I raise the question of why. Why, with 
its search dominance and its feared ability to extend its reach in related markets, why has 
Google not done so in some pretty obvious instances where it should have if it could 
have? 
Perhaps the most salient in the midst of the 2020 coronavirus epidemic, when 
everyone has retreated to working remotely, meeting, teaching, and learning through 
videoconferencing programs, why didn’t Google get a stranglehold on a market that will 
surely only grow in coming years. Despite already being integrated in Gmail and Google 
Calendar—and given how suddenly huge numbers of people were sent scrambling for 
information on which video-conferencing programs to use on short notice—Google Meet 
(formerly Google Hangouts) has barely made a dent in the videoconferencing market. By 
one measure, Google Meet/Hangouts has about 1% of the videoconferencing market, 
badly trailing Zoom, GoToWebinar, and Cisco Webex.73 The shift to videoconferencing 
should have been a layup for Google if its critics are right that it can leverage its search 
position to take over other profitable markets, and, yet, Google Meet has gone nowhere. 
 
71 Press Release, European Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €2.42 Billion for Abusing 
Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage to Own Comparison Shopping Service (June 27, 
2017), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_1784. 
72 Press Release, European Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €1.49 Billion for Abusive Practices 
in Online Advertising (Mar. 20, 2019), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_1770. 
73 See Datanyze, Market Share Category: Web Conferencing, https://www.datanyze.com/market-share/web-
conferencing--52. 
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Concentration in the digital economy in the United States has sparked loud 
criticism and spurred calls for wide-ranging reforms. These reforms include everything 
from increased enforcement of existing antitrust laws, such as challenging more mergers 
and breaking up firms, to an abandonment of the consumer welfare standard.74 Critics 
cite corruption75 and more systemic public choice problems,76 while others invoke the 
populist origins of antitrust to slay the digital Goliaths.77 On the other side, there is 
skepticism regarding these arguments.78 This chapter continues much of that skepticism.
 
74 See, e.g., Steinbaum & Stucke, supra note 21. 
75 See, e.g., David Dayen, Fiona, Apple, and Amazon: How Big Tech Pays to Win the Battle of Ideas, THE AMERICAN 
PROSPECT (July 20, 2020), https://prospect.org/power/fiona-apple-amazon-how-big-tech-pays-to-win-
battle-ideas/; Daisuke Wakabayashi, Big Tech Funds a Think Tank Pushing for Fewer Rules. For Big Tech. N.Y. 
TIMES (July 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/24/technology/global-antitrust-institute-google-
amazon-qualcomm.html.  
76 See, e.g., PHILIPPON, supra note 3, at 153-206. 
77 See, e.g., Khan, supra note 18, at 739-44; MATT STOLLER, GOLIATH: THE 100-YEAR WAR BETWEEN MONOPOLY 
POWER AND DEMOCRACY (2019). 
78 See, e.g., Joshua Wright, Elyse Dorsey, Jonathan Klick & Jan M. Rybnicek, Requiem for a Paradox: The 
Dubious Rise and Inevitable Fall of Hipster Antitrust, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 293 (2019). 
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